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Abstract 
The first Great Repression of the 21st cen-
tury, from 2007 to 2013, which saw the 
collapse of the most important economies 
in the world, had significant consequences, 
including high unemployment rates. In the 
case of the EU and the Eurozone, some 
particular difficulties had to be overcome, 
which made the crisis even deeper. The 
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so-called “Eurozone crisis” arrived when 
several countries assumed private debts 
from their bailed-out banks. Hence, it start-
ed the second part of the depression char-
acterized by the difficulties of these states 
to repay or refinance their own sovereign 
debt. The special state of development of 
the Eurozone contributed in reinforcing the 
crisis, because some structures had not 
been worked out and the traditional nation-
al tools linked to the monetary policy were 
no longer available. 
In this context, the proposal of the Europe-
an Unemployment Benefit Scheme (EUBS) 
was raised. On the one hand, it would act 
as an automatic stabilizer, that is, giving 
the Eurozone those kinds of macroeco-
nomic policies to fight against the effects of 
crisis whose lack reinforced it. On the other 
hand, it would allow a human face of the 
European economic governance to be 
shown, revitalising the social spirit of the 
European project. 
This article analyses the general framework 
of this proposal from an interdisciplinary 
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perspective, highlighting his pros and cons 
and the different varieties which have been 
introduced. Additionally, it provides the de-
tails of one recent alternative that tries to 
overcome the legal (and political) difficul-
ties to implement this translational scheme. 
 
1. The European Unemployment Benefit 
Scheme proposal after the Great Reces-
sion 
The first Great Repression of the 21st cen-
tury, from 2007 to 2013, which saw the 
collapse of the most important economies 
in the world, had significant consequences, 
including high unemployment rates. In the 
case of the EU and the Eurozone, some 
particular difficulties had to be overcome, 
which made the crisis even deeper. The 
so-called “Eurozone crisis” arrived when 
several countries assumed private debts 
from their bailed-out banks. Hence, it start-
ed the second part of the depression char-
acterized by the difficulties of these states 
to repay or refinance their own sovereign 
debt. The special state of development of 
the Eurozone contributed in reinforcing the 
crisis, because some structures had not 
been worked out and the traditional nation-
al tools linked to the monetary policy were 
no longer available.  
This produced a new phase within the re-
cession, in which the so-called austerity 
measures played a central role. Without 
other alternatives and in exchange for fi-
nancial help, these European countries 
were forced to reduce their budget deficits 
severely. The final result was more crisis, 
higher unemployment and an increasing 
anti-Europe feeling all over Europe. For ex-
ample, in the case of Spain, according to 
Eurostat, the percentage of people declar-
ing their support for the EU decreased from 
60% in 2007 to 20% in 2012. For Germa-
ny, the support went down from 47% to 
30% in the same period. 
In this context, the proposal of the Europe-
an Unemployment Benefit Scheme (EUBS) 
was raised. On the one hand, it would act 
as an automatic stabilizer, that is, giving 
the Eurozone those kinds of macroeco-
nomic policies to fight against the effects of 
crisis whose lack reinforced it. On the other 
hand, it would allow a human face of the 
European economic governance to be 
shown, revitalising the social spirit of the 
European project.  
In fact, the EUBS proposal has been at the 
heart of political debate in recent years. In 
particular, the serious problems suffered by 
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the countries of the Eurozone have resulted 
in a profound reform of the European eco-
nomic governance. Nevertheless, the fail-
ures have been so important that some 
voices claim of going toward a greater fis-
cal integration. Hence, the so-called “Five 
President Report” (and, previously, the 
“Four Presidents Report in 2012) suggest-
ed the inclusion of a «mechanism of fiscal 
stabilisation for the euro area as a whole» 
(Juncker, J. C. 2015). The European Par-
liament has been also working in this direc-
tion and, specifically, regarding the EUBS 
as the best option within automatic stabi-
lizers (European Parliament 2012).  
However, these additional ways to 
strengthen the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and, consequently the Euro-
pean project as a whole, have not suc-
ceeded so far. Great disparities among 
Member States prevent the necessary 
consensus to implement such an important 
measure being reached. In other words, 
national priorities seem to be in conflict. 
The first disparity refers to, obviously, the 
unemployment rate. From a dynamic point 
of view, whereas some countries, those 
with the lowest unemployment rates, have 
seen the number of unemployed people 
change scarcely (in the case of Germany, 
its unemployment rate was lower in 2012 -
5.4%- than in 2007 -8.4%); other have 
showed a tremendous volatility. In the case 
of Greece and Spain, the unemployment 
rates rocketed from around 8% (in the Eu-
ropean average) up to 24 % in 201293. This 
is also the case of other countries in the 
south of Europe such as Cyprus, Croatia 
and Italy. From a static perspective, the dif-
ferences between countries are huge. 
Spain and Greece, even with improve-
ments, closed 2017 with unemployment 
rates that were more than double the level 
of Member States with the lowest rate 
(Czech Republic, Malta and Germany). The 
following graph shows this evolution for all 
Member States, the EU and the Eurozone. 
  
                                               
93 The maximum was at 27.5% for Greece and 
26.1% for Spain in 2013. 
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GRAPH 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second divergence is related to ex-
penditure on unemployment benefits. Logi-
cally, the differences in unemployment are 
translated to the public expenditure which 
supports national unemployment benefits.  
In the case of Spain, one of the countries 
which suffered the crisis the most, this var-
iable increased from 2% of GDP up to 3% 
between 2007 and 2012. Then it was re-
duced to 2.4% at the end of 2016. This 
evolution is especially important if it is con-
sidered that, despite the generosity of the 
Spanish unemployment system which may 
be classified as “medium” compared to 
other European countries, it generated 
surpluses until 2008 (Pérez del Prado, D. 
2014). Consequently, a system which is 
quite equilibrated was under a “double 
contradictory pressure” because, on the 
one hand, more sources were necessary in 
order to cover the increasing number of 
unemployed people but, on the other hand, 
reducing public expenditure was imposed 
to achieve the deficit objectives for each 
year. The final result is that the coverage 
rate was reduced from more than 80% to 
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GRAPH 1 Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
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55%. This was owing to both the incapacity 
of the system to keep the level of protec-
tion in the context of an over-long reces-
sion and the cuts implemented by the Gov-
ernment. The evolution of the rest of Mem-
ber States, the EU and the Eurozone is 
shown in the following graph. 
 
GRAPH 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally and quite related to the previous 
one, the differences in the general govern-
ment deficit or surplus are also important 
across the European Union. The following 
graph shows the evolution for 2007, 2012 
and 2015. In the case of Spain, the situa-
tion changed from a surplus of 2% GDP in 
2007 to a deficit of 10.5% in 2012. On the 
other hand, Luxemburg and Germany 
maintained surpluses during the full reces-
sion period.  
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These and other divergences may explain 
some of the difficulties in attempting to 
achieve the objective of implementing the 
European Unemployment Benefit Scheme 
(EUBS) proposal, that is, a common unem-
ployment benefit for European countries. 
Despite some of the aims related to the 
economic governance being common, the 
national priorities vary because the situa-
tion in each country is very different. Nev-
ertheless, the inclusion of this scheme 
would be able to produce some important 
economic benefits for all economies in the 
EU. This point will be analysed in the follow-
ing section. 
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2. Discussing different alternatives from an 
economic and legal point of view 
2.1.The economic perspective: pros and 
cons 
The special difficulties suffered by Euro-
zone countries during the recession forced 
them to take some important measures 
and discuss alternatives to prevent a re-
peat in the future. Within these proposals, 
there is a rather extended consensus 
among economists about the beneficial ef-
fects of introducing automatic stabilizers in 
the Eurozone (since (Marjolin et al. 1975), 
(MacDoughal 1977), (Padoa-Schioppa & 
Communities 1987), (Emerson 1992) to, 
more recently, (Allard et al. 2013), (Alcidi, 
Giovannini, & Piedrafita 2014), (De Grauwe 
& Yuemei 2016), among others).  
Despite there exist large variety of options 
(regional policies, public investment, Euro-
bonds, special funds or progressive taxa-
tion), a common unemployment benefit 
scheme has been considered by different 
authors the most attractive alternative. 
There are a number of important reasons: 
a) it represents a type of expenditure that is 
anti-cyclical; b) it acts automatically in the 
event of recession; c) it has a high multipli-
er effect; d) it is a mechanism which acts 
very quickly; and e) it provides income 
support to those individuals in society who 
bear a large part of the social costs. 
However, this debate appears and disap-
pears in waves, according to the social and 
political situation during and after and an 
economic crisis (this was the case in the 
70-80’s, 90’s and nowadays). Consequent-
ly, from a political perspective it would be 
necessary to keep the discussion as a 
structural part of the economic construc-
tion of the EU and Eurozone and/or using 
the current situation in different European 
countries as argument. 
The different proposals regarding the Eu-
ropean Unemployment Benefit Scheme 
(EUBS) may be analysed as follows:  
On the one hand, it is possible to find two 
approaches regarding the mechanism it-
self. Some authors propose an “individual” 
or “direct” EUBS (also called “genuine”), 
that is, the classical unemployment benefits 
covering unemployed individuals directly by 
the European level. Others prefer the op-
tion of a “State” or “indirect” EUBS (also 
named “equivalent”), in other words, a 
scheme consisting in supporting the States’ 
systems and, consequently, providing pro-
tection to individuals indirectly.  
On the other hand, the debate also con-
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cerns a number of economic technical is-
sues such as financing and cost, preven-
tion from moral hazard, countries involved 
or stabilization impact. These are present in 
all proposals without considering the type. 
Nevertheless, these studies rarely compre-
hend other kinds of additional technical 
analysis, such as the legal viability of the 
hypothetical implementation of each alter-
native. 
This aim does not aim to analyse the details 
of all these versions, but the advantages 
and disadvantages of each one must be 
highlighted in order to focus the main 
points of the debate. Consequently, some 
elements of the different versions and pro-
posals will be lost in exchange of a clearer 
explanation. 
Concerning both types of EUBS, on the 
one hand, the indirect version requires the 
least grade of intervention or harmonization 
so, a priori, it would be the easiest form of 
implementation from a legal point of view. 
However, it also means some disad-
vantages such as “free riding” (del Monte, 
M. & Zandstra, T. 2014), that is, countries 
would be incentivized to increase the gen-
erosity of their unemployment benefit sys-
tem considering it is covered by the Union. 
On the other hand, the direct version 
means a higher grade of integration, which 
is both an advantage and a disadvantage. 
The first because it strengthens the effects 
attributed to a supranational coordinated 
system and the European project itself; the 
latter, because the legal (and political) diffi-
culties also rise. These does not only com-
prehend the modification of the treaties, 
the creation of new regulation and new 
sources of finance, but also the reform of 
national rules in order to coordinate them 
with the European system and both of them 
with active employment policies.  
Regarding technical issues, financing is 
probably the most controversial one. Here, 
it is possible to find three different types of 
mechanisms. Firstly, the creation of new 
taxes or contributions, such as a payroll tax 
(Dullien 2012) (Dullien 2013) or a corpo-
rate tax (Pisani-Ferry, Vihriälä, & Wolff 
2013). These alternatives have the ad-
vantage of being an exclusive source of the 
system and its close relation with it and the 
beneficiaries. Additionally, in the first case, 
it tries to replicate the national system at 
European level. On the other hand, the 
main disadvantage concerns the increase 
of labour or corporate tax and its effects on 
labour and capital factors. Second, it is al-
so possible to finance EUBS by specific 
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contributions to a fund or budget, as per-
centage of GDP, fixed or variable (Beblavý, 
Gros, y Maselli 2015) (Dolls et al. 2015). 
This alternative avoids the problem of tax-
ing productive factors, but it is not directly 
linked to the system and its beneficiaries. 
Finally, financing EUBS by debt and, par-
ticularly, by the so-called “Eurobonds” have 
been also on the table (Beblavý, M. & Le-
naerts, K. 2017). However, this is probably 
the most controversial option and it at-
tracted strong opposition from those who 
do not accept the mutualisation of the debt 
in the Eurozone.  
2.2. The legal approach: looking for viable 
alternatives 
2.2.1. The legal base of the EUBS pro-
posal: a first approach 
From a legal perspective, transforming 
these proposals into a viable project means 
the consideration of many legal problems, 
some of them closely related to the political 
ones. Following the same methodology, on-
ly the most common and practical ones will 
be analysed. Hence, the first point is trying 
to fit the proposals in the European legal 
system, taking into consideration the differ-
ent ways offered by the European Law.  
The first one is the Treaty, which considers 
social policy (social security) as a shared 
competence (article 4 TFEU), but in which 
States keep a strong intervention (Pérez 
Domínguez 2017). Accordingly, the first 
step in order to implement a EUBS pro-
posal is to determine if the Treaty offers a 
legal base which is enough to set this 
mechanism. If the proposal remains within 
the limits of the Treaty, that is, the compe-
tence of the EU, it would be possible to de-
velop it through the legal mechanisms ex-
plained below. On the contrary, if the pro-
ject goes further than these limits, reform of 
the Treaty (primary legislation) would be 
needed, which means some additional po-
litical difficulties. Actually, this is the case of 
the projects which propose to substitute 
national systems with a European one be-
cause article 153 TFEU sets the EU’s role 
as supporting and complementing the ac-
tivities of Member States in the field of so-
cial security and social protection. Never-
theless, considering the grade of interven-
tion in the Treaty, the requirements may 
differ. 
Concretely, two procedures are set. The 
“ordinary revision procedure” concerns key 
amendments (such as increasing or reduc-
ing the competences of the EU) and it re-
quires a rather complex procedure includ-
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ing the creation of a Convention, a Confer-
ence of representatives of the governments 
of EU countries and, finally and frequently, 
the call for a referendum if it is required by 
national constitutions. The “simplified revi-
sion procedure” refers to internal policies 
and actions (for example, agriculture and 
fisheries, internal market, border controls, 
economic and monetary policy) and aims 
to facilitate further European integration 
and avoids the need to celebrate the Con-
vention and the Conference. However, 
unanimity in the Council is required and the 
competences of the EU may not be ex-
tended by means of this procedure. 
Within the limits of the Treaty reforms, 
when national competences are involved or 
there are serious doubts about it, some 
“innovative” and intermediate tools have 
been used recently, as in the case of the 
so-called “European Stability Mechanism” 
(ESM). In order to implement it more easily, 
avoiding the ordinary procedure, a minor 
reform of the Treaties (by simplified proce-
dure) was applied (concretely, on the arti-
cle 136 TFEU), whereas an international 
treaty among Member States created an 
intergovernmental organization, which op-
erates under public international law, to 
provide access to financial assistance pro-
grammes for member states of the Euro-
zone in financial difficulty. In other words, it 
meant the creation of a new tool outside 
the EU legal system but connected to it. 
Despite it being a rather controversial tool 
(Craig, P. 2013), it has been declared fully 
legal by the CJEU (C-370/12, Pringle 
Case). This “third way” may be also taken 
into consideration, but keeping in mind the 
limits set in Pringle.  
Secondly, within the framework of the Trea-
ties, it would be possible to use other insti-
tutions already created within the EU legal 
system, which is the easiest way because it 
means the reform of secondary legislation. 
The Treaty provides two options (Miranda 
Boto 2011): a) harmonization that, accord-
ing to article 4 TFEU, would require the in-
clusion of the issue (as it is the case) in the 
Treaty; b) another possibility coordination 
(article 5 TFEU). Both mechanisms have a 
different scope.  
Whereas harmonization supposes the most 
intense way of approximation of national 
legislations, setting some minimum stand-
ards or common rules; coordination implies 
a lower level of incidence, because it aims 
to achieve some general common objec-
tives, implying minor changes on national 
regulations (Herrero Suárez y Peñas Mo-
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yano 2013). Considering the magnitude of 
some proposals, the latter does not seem 
strong enough to implement them. Howev-
er, this does not mean that coordination is 
not useful as a necessary complement of 
the EUBS project.  
Concretely, the grade of development of 
the current Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordina-
tion of social security systems is still so far 
from its maximum possibilities. For exam-
ple, an unemployed person who satisfies 
the conditions of the legislation of the com-
petent Member State for entitlement to 
benefits and who goes to another Member 
State in order to seek work, there shall re-
tain his entitlement to unemployment bene-
fits for a period of three months up to six 
months only, depending on the circum-
stances. In the same sense, the use of so-
cial security contributions in another coun-
try different to which they were generated 
is also limited by the fact of contributing 
and losing an employment in the latter. 
These and other limits are explained, 
among others, by the mistrust of the moni-
tor mechanisms of other Member States 
and the desire of controlling and limiting 
the unemployment benefits expenditure 
and its effects from a geographical point of 
view. Nevertheless, this produces a nega-
tive effect on job mobility, and most im-
portantly for the EUBS project, it strongly 
limits unemployment benefit schemes inte-
gration, which helps in the creation of high-
er levels of protection. 
On the other hand, regarding harmoniza-
tion, its potential depends on the kind of 
EUBS proposal. Obviously, those focused 
on the creation of an autonomous Europe-
an system fall outside the limits of this legal 
mechanism, whereas others which aim to 
complement a national system may be in-
cluded under its coverage because it would 
be supporting national programs in setting 
some minimum thresholds.  
However, some important limits concern 
this way. These depend on the kind of pro-
posal, even though some of them must be 
highlighted. Firstly, according to article 153 
(4) TFEU, the provision of the EU adopted 
in the social security and social protection 
field «shall not affect the right of Member 
States to define the fundamental principles 
of their social security systems and must 
not significantly affect the financial equilib-
rium thereof». Second, the tool set to har-
monize legislations is the Directive, which is 
not probably the best solution in order to 
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achieve the objective of EUBS (94). Never-
theless, it would be adequate to set some 
minimum and common requirements in to 
access to financial help (following the 
American model), which requires its com-
bination with other legislative measures. 
Anyway, the creation of European institu-
tions on the base of national regulation is 
not a novelty, as the case of European 
work council shows. Finally, the use of this 
legal way also requires the especial legisla-
tive procedure and, consequently, the 
Council shall act unanimously, after con-
sulting the European Parliament and Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. 
2.2.2. Discussing different alternatives from 
a legal perspective: pros and cons 
On these basis, the objective of implement-
ing a EUBS requires analysing the different 
alternatives proposed by the economists 
(mainly) from the legal alternatives per-
spective. 
Concerning the two main models, on the 
one hand, , despite genuine EUBS seems 
to have a greater stabilization impact and 
                                               
94 Other ways, such as the paragraph k), «the mod-
ernisation of social protection systems », which re-
quires the ordinary legislative measure, has never 
been used in the field of unemployment benefits and 
it contents the specific exception of social security 
and social protection of workers. 
means the most developed model from the 
European integration point of view, it would 
face some important legal obstacles. The 
most important one would be the reform of 
the Treaty by the ordinary procedure, what 
requires national acceptances and, conse-
quently, in some cases, its approval by ref-
erendum. Therefore, any proposal which 
comprehends the modification of the cur-
rent status of competences, implies the 
right of Member States to define the fun-
damental principles of their social security 
systems, or significantly affects the finan-
cial equilibrium thereof will be covered to 
this procedure. Despite the issue being re-
ally attractive for most citizens, showing the 
social face of Europe after a hard and long 
period of crisis, the political environment is 
not propitious considering the results of 
referendums in the last decade. Special dif-
ficulties arise in the Central and Nordic 
countries, in which this kind of measures 
are not really popular (Hacker & Cédric 
2017).  
Alternatively, the equivalent EUBS seems 
to be easier compared to the previous one, 
but technical difficulties are also important. 
Firstly, it is not clear that the modification of 
the Treaties may be avoided. In the best 
situation, the simplified procedure would be 
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applied, which means unanimity in the 
Council. Second, in the case of the 
amendment of the Treaties not being nec-
essary, it is not clear if the classical meth-
ods of regulation and, specially, harmoniza-
tion would be enough to build the EUBS 
project. Finally, even considering the limits 
of harmonization, different requirements 
connected to the legal base chosen to de-
velop the proposal must be also satisfied. 
A “third way” (symbolized by example of 
ESM) would also be possible, with or with-
out the modification of the Treaties, by 
sending the regulation to an extra-EU (or 
extra-EMU) mechanism. However, as the 
CJEU sets in Pringle, this type of alternative 
may not be used to overpass the Treaties, 
infringing the EU Law. Consequently, the 
requirements of the case law must be ful-
filled and, finally, the competences cannot 
be altered.  
But the technical difficulties regarding the 
implementation of each model are also 
translated to the different varieties of each 
one. For example, regarding finances, arti-
cle 311 TFUE sets that the creation of new 
categories of own resources require a 
Council’s decision, adopted by the special 
legislative procedure, unanimously and af-
ter consulting the European Parliament. 
However, this is not enough, because it 
adds that the decision shall not enter into 
force until it is approved by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. So, again, 
some national problems may raise. This 
would be the case of a new system of con-
tributions or payroll taxes, but also any kind 
of new contributions, as some proposed as 
percentage of GDP. 
Consequently, the easiest way to imple-
ment the EUBS would be the equivalent 
model. Nevertheless, the legal require-
ments to develop it depend on the type of 
proposal95. The next section will use a re-
cent proposal to exemplify it. 
 
3. How to implement the EUBS: a recent 
proposal 
3.1. The proposal: a general description 
Recently, (Dullien, S. & Pérez del Prado, D. 
2018) have suggested a “compromise 
proposal” which is focused on avoiding po-
litical discord. This is based on an equiva-
lent system financed by payments from 
countries’ budget. Under such a scheme, 
each country would pay 0.1 per cent of its 
                                               
95 (Repasi, R. 2017) analyses the legal viability of 
several options.  
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GDP each year into a common European 
unemployment fund. Eighty per cent of its 
pay-ins would be deposited in a national 
compartment; whereas the other twenty 
per cent would polled into a “stormy day 
fund” (a common compartment for very 
large shocks).  
Pay-outs would be made whenever the un-
employment rate increased more than 0.2 
percentage points above its average rate 
for the previous five years. Concretely, if 
unemployment increased by more than 0.2 
percentage points, countries could draw 
money from their national compartments. 
Nevertheless, whether a country were hit 
by a very large shock, defined as increases 
in the unemployment rate of 2 percentage 
points or more, additional payments would 
be made from the “stormy day fund”.  
Within this framework, each country would 
be allowed to run a cumulative deficit in its 
national compartment of up to 5 percent of 
its GDP. In this first instance, this deficit 
would be financed by loans from other na-
tional compartments. In the event that all 
funds should be depleted, the scheme 
would be replenished by borrowing in fi-
nancial markets. The system would thus be 
allowed to issue bonds, backed by future 
contributions as collateral. Finally, in order 
to counter the fear of permanent transfers, 
a dynamic claw-back system would be part 
of the system. 
Regarding its legal implementation, this re-
port also borrows elements from prior stud-
ies, trying to adapt them to the particular 
characteristics of this proposal. Despite le-
gal literature is limited, it shows a clear 
trend. Whereas initial analysis concluded 
that EUBS would require the amendment of 
the Treaties (European Commission 2012) 
(Fuchs, M. 2013) (Repasi, R. 2013) 96 ; 
nowadays, most papers set the contrary 
position, that is, it is possible to materialize 
most of the proposals on the bases of the 
current EU primary and secondary legisla-
tion, without changing the Treaties.  
This report is not an exception. Conse-
quently, within the framework of the Trea-
ties, it suggests some alternatives support-
ed by use existing legal mechanisms of the 
EU Law. In order to clarify the analysis 
these mechanisms, they are classified con-
sidering a) the payment side of the scheme 
and the conditions linked to it and b) the fi-
nancing issues. 
                                               
96 In this last case, the author shows some doubts 
about the possibilities given by Articles 352 and 
153(1) TFEU. 
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3.2. Legal alternatives for its practical de-
velopment 
3.2.1. Options for the payment side 
Concerning the payment side, there are 
four main possibilities: the multilateral sur-
veillance procedure (Article 121(6) TFEU), 
fiscal assistance in case of crisis (Article 
122 (2) TFEU), funds concerning social 
cohesion (Article 175 (3) TFEU) and the 
so-called “flexibility clause” (Article 352(1) 
TFEU). 
Firstly, multilateral surveillance is a macro-
economic stabilization instrument for policy 
coordination. This coordination requires 
Member States to follow the recommenda-
tions given by Commission’s guidelines (Ar-
ticle 126(2)). Furthermore, Article 121(6) 
prohibits Union legislator to introduce other 
sanctions than those foreseen by Article 
121(4). This means the whole multilateral 
surveillance procedure is built on the base 
of non-binding rules, what makes it an in-
appropriate instrument to set the EUBS. 
This conclusion does not change by the 
fact that Article 136(1) permits to «adopt 
measures specific to those Member States 
whose currency is the euro» because its 
scope is also the multilateral surveillance 
procedure (Repasi, R. 2017).  
Second, the Treaty permits to grant, under 
certain conditions, Union financial assis-
tance to the Member States in difficulties or 
seriously threatened with severe difficulties 
(Article 122(2)) TFEU. This clear connec-
tion to economic and financial problems 
makes it adequate as legal base for EUBS, 
especially for the equivalent type. However, 
it faces two kinds of limitations. On the one 
hand, it would be appropriate for the most 
severe situations (Repasi, R. 2017)97. On 
the other hand, it only and would require 
the parallel adoption of “certain condi-
tions”, what implies that financial assis-
tance can only be granted on a case-by-
case basis (Beblavý, M. & Lenaerts, K. 
2017) and, therefore, it prevents from ap-
plying the mechanism automatically ac-
cording to a certain trigger, as it is the 
case98. 
Third, some authors have proposed that 
the legal framework of funds devoted to 
social cohesion (Article 175(3) TFEU) 
would be another legal base to develop any 
kind of equivalent EUBS (Ferrante, V. 
                                               
97 This paper sets this legal base would be adequate 
for an equivalent EUBS with a trigger of >2 of un-
employment rate, which would only permit to acti-
vate the stormy day fund in our proposal 
98 However, the Council has a wide discretion to de-
fine what economic difficulties is and, additionally, it 
is also possible to think about ex ante conditions 
and not only ex post, what would facilitate the appli-
cation of this Article. 
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2016) (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Fi-
nanze 2016) (Ministero dell’Economia e 
delle Finanze September 2016a). Accord-
ing to the first paragraph of Article 175 
TFEU, the Union shall support the 
achievement of some objectives, among 
others social cohesion, by the action it 
takes through specific Funds. Neverthe-
less, it will also be possible to adopt «spe-
cific actions» outside the Funds if they are 
necessary and in accordance with the or-
dinary legislative procedure (paragraph 3). 
According to these studies, this “specific 
actions” could include everything needed 
to implement EUBS. Nevertheless, other 
authors reject this legal base because the 
equivalent system focuses on the macroe-
conomic stabilization effect in times of cri-
sis and, consequently, it would not be a 
proper mechanism to reduce social and 
economic disparities related to social co-
hesion (Repasi, R. 2017)  
Finally, the so-called “flexibility clause” 
seems to be the legal tool which raises 
wider consensus. According to Article 
352(1) TFEU, its application requires to ful-
fil four conditions. First, the Union action 
has to be necessary to achieve the «objec-
tives set out in the Treaties». In the case of 
EUBS, Article 3(3) TEU calls for establish-
ing «a highly competitive social market», 
aiming at «full employment and social pro-
gress» and promoting «social justice and 
protection», «economic, social and territo-
rial cohesion» and «solidarity among 
Member States» 99 . Second, this action 
must be developed «within the framework 
of the policies defined by the Treaties». In 
other words, it must be at least a shared 
competence, what permits Union to act. 
Furthermore, it is possible to justify that Eu-
ropean level is the most appropriate to 
compensate asymmetric shocks100. Third, 
the Treaties must not provide for the nec-
essary powers. The reference to the «poli-
cies defined by the Treaties» has to be un-
derstood as the use of this clause is possi-
ble if there are no other possibilities in the 
Treaties. As none of the previous alterna-
tives are a clear legal base, this would be 
the only solution. Finally, the Court of Jus-
tice of European Union established a fur-
ther limit, which is the prohibition of an im-
                                               
99 These objectives have to be read, among others, 
in conjunction with Article 9 TFEU, according to 
which in «defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, the Union shall take into account require-
ments linked to the promotion of a high level of em-
ployment, the guarantee of adequate social protec-
tion, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
level of education, training and protection of human 
health». 
100 This is clearly kinked to the principle of subsidi-
arity (Article 5(3) TEU). 
49 – CROSS BORDER BENEFITS ALLIANCE – EUROPE REVIEW 
 
 
 
plicit Treaty amendment 101 . This means 
that the distribution of competences must 
not be altered, and constitutional saving 
clause must be respected. In this particular 
field, the latter requires shall not affect the 
right of Member States to define the fun-
damental principles of their social security 
systems and must not significantly affect 
the financial equilibrium thereof (Article 153 
(4) TFEU)102. Concerning this issue, it must 
be highlighted that that a regulation estab-
lishing a EUBS on the basis of Articles 
352(1) TFEU always has to be adopted by 
unanimity in the Council, so Member States 
may raise their veto to safeguard their con-
stitutional clause. 
Nevertheless, Article 352 must not be ap-
plied solely because it is subject to the bail-
out clause embedded in Article 125 (1) 
TFEU. Under this clause and according to 
the interpretation given by Pringle case 
law103, the transfer of funding from the EU 
level to Member States, in case such a 
transfer is not explicitly foreseen by the 
Treaties, must be justified by the adoption 
of any kind of contagion, such as the im-
                                               
101 CJEU, Opinion 2/94 [1996], ECR I-1759, para. 
30. 
102 And this links to the principle of proportionality 
(Article 5(4) TFEU). 
103 CJEU Case C-370/12, Pringle, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras 130-136. 
plementation of structural reforms. Con-
cretely, three kinds of mechanisms have 
been consider adequate to function as a 
justification: experience rating, claw-back 
and minimum requirements with regard to 
activation policies (Beblavý, M. & Lenaerts, 
K. 2017) (Repasi, R. 2017). 
According to this proposal, the combina-
tion of national compartments and a dy-
namic claw-back system would enough to 
fulfil the requirements of conditionality set 
Article 125(1) TFEU. Additionally, other 
mechanisms would be also compatible, 
such as the experience rating mechanism 
or setting minimum requirements related to 
active employment policies.  
3.2.2. Options for the financing side 
Regarding financing side, there are two 
possibilities. On the one hand, EUBS may 
be financed by the general Union budget. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to fi-
nance it by a dedicated fund outside the 
Union general budget.  
Concerning the specific line within the 
budget, Article 311 (2) TFEU sets Union 
budget has two kinds of sources: “own re-
sources” and “other revenues“. Whereas 
“own sources” are primarily intended to fi-
nance the general Union budget, “other 
revenues” may be used to finance a specif-
50 – CROSS BORDER BENEFITS ALLIANCE – EUROPE REVIEW 
 
 
 
ic purpose. The latter category is chosen 
because it has two clear advantages: its 
regulation is more flexible and it may be 
dedicated to a specific purpose. 
On this basis, new contributions should be 
created and defined by the same legal act 
that established the legal framework for the 
payments (and the whole EUBS), which the 
contributions should finance. In this regard, 
financial contributions paid by EU Member 
States, which are additional to the contri-
butions paid by Member States under the 
Own Resources Decision104, must, in prin-
ciple, follow the rules given by Article 
311(3) TFEU. In other words, the especial 
legislative procedure is required and, con-
sequently, the Council shall act unanimous-
ly, after consulting the European Parlia-
ment and Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions and in 
accordance with their respective constitu-
tional requirements. 
Nevertheless, in the existing Union agen-
cies (such as the European Bank Authori-
ty), it is possible to find some precedents in 
which this procedure is avoided by using a 
different legal base. Consequently, it would 
                                               
104 2014/335/EU, Euratom: Council Decision of 26 
May 2014 on the system of own resources of the 
European Union. OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 105–111 
be possible to create these new contribu-
tions on the base of the above mentioned 
Article 352 TFEU, which only requires una-
nimity in the Council (Repasi, R. 2017). 
On the other hand, States’ contributions 
may finance an external fund. In this re-
gard, the European Social Fund may play 
an important role, because according to ar-
ticle 162 it aims to «improve employment 
opportunities for workers in the internal 
market and to contribute thereby to raising 
the standard of living». The main problem 
is that ESF has never been used for pas-
sive employment policies, only for active 
ones. Consequently, its use would require 
a profound reform, introducing some ele-
ments which have been strange to its con-
tent so far and, probably, the amendment 
of the Treaty as well. In any case, this fund 
would be an effective instrument in order to 
develop measures on active employment 
policies to complement the EUBS. 
Nevertheless, there are other possibilities 
whose application seems to be easier. For 
example, Member States could sign an in-
ternational treaty to create an intergovern-
mental organization, which operates under 
public international law, to provide access 
to financial assistance within the EUBS 
framework. This was the case of the so-
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called “European Stability Mechanism” 
(ESM). Moreover, it would be also possible 
to create, using Article 352 (2) TFEU as le-
gal base, a Union agency with a legal per-
sonality distinct form the Union, whose 
budget is the fund. 
3.2.3. Other alternatives 
Finally, along with all these alternatives and 
comprehending both payment and financ-
ing sides, the report suggests that it would 
be possible to implement the proposal by 
either concluding an international agree-
ment amongst a subset of Member States 
(which is a solution rather similar to one 
mentioned above but with a broader 
scope105) or by establishing an enhanced 
cooperation according to Article 20 TFEU. 
This option would permit to avoid the re-
quirement of unanimity in the Council.  
In the first case, the CJEU decided in the 
mentioned Pringle case, that the Member 
States may conclude this kind of interna-
tional agreements in areas in which the Un-
ion has not already regulated. Additionally, 
some other conditions must be respected. 
Accordingly, international agreements 
must: not modify Primary law; be in compli-
ance with Primary law and Secondary law; 
                                               
105 Actually, this would be another possibility even 
for all Member States as the ESM shows. 
affect exclusive Union competences or 
shared competences; only be concluded if 
the Union legislative procedure failed or is 
likely to fail; must not circumvent Union leg-
islative procedure or the Treaties. 
In the second option, the most relevant ob-
stacle is the prohibition under Article 
326(2) TFEU to undermine the internal 
market or economic, social and territorial 
cohesion. However, some authors have 
conclude this is not a real barrier consider-
ing EUBS would not impede the social co-
hesion of the Union but only strengthen the 
one between the participating Member 
States (Repasi, R. 2017). 
 
4. Conclusions 
The debate on the creation of a common 
unemployment benefit scheme for the EU 
or the Eurozone is circular. During eco-
nomic crisis it emerges as an intelligent so-
lution to combine social protection and effi-
cient macroeconomic policies. After that, it 
fades until the following economic collapse. 
The so-called “Great Recession” has em-
phasised the necessity of creating macroe-
conomic stabilizers for the Eurozone, as a 
part of the plans for achieving a deeper 
and fairer Economic and Monetary Union. 
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The EUBS has been in the core of the polit-
ical debate again. 
Economist were the first ones in analysing 
its viability, assessing the pros and cons of 
this proposal from both national and Euro-
pean perspective. Now, it is also possible 
to find deep legal analysis. As it was men-
tioned before, whereas initial studies con-
cluded that EUBS would require the 
amendment of the Treaties; nowadays, 
most papers set the contrary position, that 
is, it is possible to materialize most of the 
proposals on the bases of the current EU 
primary and secondary legislation, without 
changing the Treaties. These legal alterna-
tives open a new stage in the debate: a 
decisive leap towards the political arena.  
Both the European Commission and the 
European Parliament have shown their in-
terest in this proposal, promoting these 
studies and analysis in different levels and 
context. Some discussions have been also 
held but without producing any concrete 
decision. The scientific debate seems to be 
mature enough to generate a rigorous, 
concrete and serious political discussion 
about the potential implementation of the 
EUBS. 
The recovery is a good moment to hold this 
kind of public debate without any kind of 
inherence related to the difficulties of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, this lack of pressure is 
usually the cause of its failure. As historical 
precedents show, economic recoveries al-
so have the risks of underestimating the 
problems which must be solved, postpon-
ing its solution of a further opportunity 
which never arrives. 
But this recovery also shows additional dif-
ficulties which prevent from having this in-
evitable discussion. The emergence of na-
tionalisms and populisms all over Europe 
(and in other parts of the Globe) makes 
that adopting significant decisions about 
European integration, as the EUBS, is 
something as difficult as the times we are 
living. 
However, each historical context has its 
own particularities. Other problems con-
cerned Europe in the past, but political de-
termination achieved to overcome them. 
The current European project is the result 
of those decisions and its future will de-
pend on the political determination and 
strong resolve. 
 
5. Bibliography 
Alcidi, C., Giovannini, A. & Piedrafita, S. 
2014. «Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU 
53 – CROSS BORDER BENEFITS ALLIANCE – EUROPE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Governance». SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
2561211. Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. 
Allard, C., Brooks, P. K. Bluedorn, J. C., 
Bornhorst, F., Ohnsorge, F. & Christopher-
son, K M. 2013. Toward A Fiscal Union for 
the Euro Area. International Monetary 
Fund. 
Beblavý, M., D. Gros, & I. Maselli. 2015. 
«Reinsurance of national unemployment 
benefit schemes.» CEPS Working Docu-
ment,. Brussels: CEPS. 
Beblavý, M., & Lenaerts, K. 2017. «Feasi-
bility and Added Value of a European Un-
employment Benefit Scheme. Main findings 
from a comprehensive research project». 
Brussels: European Commission (DG 
EMPL). 
Craig, P. 2013. «Pringle and Use of EU In-
stitutions Outside the EU Legal Framework: 
Foundations, Procedure and Substance». 
European Constitutional Law Review 9 (2): 
263-84. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S157401961200
1149. 
De Grauwe, P., & J. Yuemei. 2016. «Flexi-
bility versus Stability: A difficult trade-off in 
the eurozone | Centre for European Policy 
Studies». CEPS Working Document No. 
422. Brussels: CEPS. 
del Monte, M., & Zandstra, T. 2014. 
«Common unemployment insurance 
scheme for the euro area. Cost of Non-
Europe Report». European Parliamentary 
Research Service. 
Dolls, M., Fuest, C., Neumann, D. & Peichl, 
A.. 2015. «An Unemployment Insurance 
Scheme for the Euro Area? A Comparison 
of Different Alternatives Using Micro Data». 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2694468. Roch-
ester, NY: Social Science Research Net-
work. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2694468
. 
Dullien, S. 2012. «A European unemploy-
ment insurance as a stabilization device–
Selected issues.» European Commission 
(DG EMPL). 
———. 2013. «A euro-area wide unem-
ployment insurance as an automatic stabi-
lizer: Who benefits and who pays.» Euro-
pean Commission (DG EMPL). 
Dullien, S., & Pérez del Prado, D. 2018. 
«How to stabilize the euro area economy 
without creating political discord: a com-
promise proposal for a European Unem-
ployment Insurance Scheme». Madrid: 
FES. 
Emerson, M. 1992. One Market, One 
Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Ben-
54 – CROSS BORDER BENEFITS ALLIANCE – EUROPE REVIEW 
 
 
 
efits and Costs of Forming an Economic 
and Monetary Union. Oxford University 
Press. 
European Commission. 2012. «A Blueprint 
for a deep and genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union: Launching a European 
debate». COM(2012) 777 final du 
28.11.2012. Brussels: European Commis-
sion. 
European Parliament. 2012. «European 
Parliament resolution of 20 November 
2012 with recommendations to the Com-
mission on the report of the Presidents of 
the European Council, the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank 
and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’». Stras-
bourg: European Parliament. 
Ferrante, V. 2016. «The European unem-
ployment benefit scheme: the way ahead». 
I Quaderni del CEDRI 3. 
Fuchs, M. 2013. «Assessing the impact of 
an EMU UBS on diverse national benefits 
systems: (To what extent) Do we need 
common eligibility rules?» Brussels: Ber-
telsmann-Stiftung. 
Hacker, B., & Cédric, M. K. 2017. «The di-
vided Eurozone Mapping Confl icting Inter-
ests on the Reform of the Monetary Un-
ion». Politk für europa #2017 plus. Brus-
sels: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
Herrero Suárez, C., & Peñas Moyano, M. J. 
2013. «Normas comunes sobre compe-
tencia, fiscalidad y aproximación de legis-
laciones» in Políticas comunitarias bases 
jurídicas, Martín de la Guardia, R. & Calon-
ge Velázquez, A. (eds.). Valencia: tirant lo 
blanch. 
Juncker, j. C. 2015. «realizar la unión eco-
nómica y monetaria europea». Bruselas: 
comisión europea. 
Macdoughal, d. 1977. «report of the study 
group on the role of public finance in euro-
pean integration.» eur-op. 
Marjolin, r., f. Bobba, h. Bosman, g. 
Brouwers, l. Camu, i. Clappier, i. Foighel, 
et al. 1975. «report of the study group 
“economic and monetary union 1980”». 
Brussels: european commission. 
Ministero dell’economia e delle Finanze. 
September 2016a. «A European Unem-
ployment Benefit Scheme: Nine Clarifica-
tions». 
———. 2016. «European Unemployment 
Benefit Scheme». 
Miranda Boto, J. M.. 2011. «Las compe-
tencias de la Unión Europea en materia 
social: panorama y perspectivas de futu-
ro». Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo e In-
migración, n.o 92: 75-106. 
55 – CROSS BORDER BENEFITS ALLIANCE – EUROPE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Padoa-Schioppa, T., & Commission of the 
European Communities. 1987. Efficiency, 
Stability, and Equity: A Strategy for the 
Evolution of the Economic System of the 
European Community : A Report. Oxford 
University Press. 
Pérez del Prado, D. 2014. Prestación por 
desempleo: intensidad, duración y control. 
Valladolid: Lex Nova - Thomson Reuters. 
Pérez Domínguez, F. 2017. «Unión Euro-
pea y Estado Social: más allá de las cartas 
de Derechos» in Constitución e Integración 
Europea: forma política, gobernanza eco-
nómica, organización territorial, editado por 
Raffiotta, E. C. Pérez Miras, A. & Teruel 
Lozano, G. M. (eds.). Madrid: Dykinson. 
Pisani-Ferry, J, Vihriälä, E. & Wolff, G. B.. 
2013. «Options for a Euro-Area Fiscal Ca-
pacity». Working Paper 2013/01. Bruegel 
Policy Contribution. 
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/72
119. 
Repasi, R. 2013. «Legal Options for an 
Additional EMU Fiscal Capacity». Brussels: 
European Parliament. 
———. 2017. «Legal Options and Limits 
for the Establishment of a European Un-
employment Benefit Scheme». CEPS- Eu-
ropean Commission. 
 
  
